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The Good Will 
The overall strategy of Kant's moral theory is to derive the content of moral 
obligations from the very concept of an obligation. Kant thinks that we can figure 
out what morality requires by analyzing the very idea of being morally required 
to do something. Where I am using the word 'obligation' or ‘requirement’, Kant 
uses the German word Pflicht, which is usually translated into English as "duty" 
— an unfortunately antiquated term for what he has in mind. Sticking to Kant’s 
terminology, however, we can say that the strategy is to figure out what duty 
requires by analyzing what duty is. 
     Kant says, “[W]e shall set before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains 
that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances” 
(397, 10).2 What he means is that the concept of duty is the concept of a 
requirement to do something whether or not we want to, indeed even if we want 
not to. When Kant speaks of “a good will ... under certain subjective limitations 
and hindrances”, he means a will that does something just because of being 
required to and despite wanting not to. Kant reasons that if we couldn’t act that 
way, then we couldn’t be required to act that way, and so we wouldn’t have any 
duties at all. He concludes that if we have duties, then we must be capable of 
                                                
1 To appear in Moral Philosophy, ed. George Sher (Oxford: Routledge, projected 2012). This essay 
supersedes my “Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”, which appeared in my book Self to Self; 
Selected Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 16–44. I hope that it is more 
faithful to both the letter and the spirit of the text — which is not to say that it is especially 
faithful to either one. My understanding of the Groundwork has profited from discussion with 
many graduate students who have attended my undergraduate Ethics course as teaching 
assistants or auditors, including: Jonny Cottrell, Mihailis Diamantis, Grace Helton, Shieva 
Kleinschmidt, Colin Marshall, Nick Riggle, Ang Tong; and especially Nandi Theunissen, who 
provided detailed written comments on an earlier draft, and Melis Erdur, who provided a key 
element of the interpretation (see note 14, below). Finally, I’m indebted to Kyla Ebels Duggan for 
comments on the penultimate draft. 
2 References are, first, to the standard Academy Edition of the Groudwork and then to the 
Cambridge Texts edition, edited and translated by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977). Central Kantian terms are set in bold at their first appearance. 
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acting on them in opposition to our desires. (Where we speak of desires, Kant 
speaks of inclinations.)   
     Note that this conception of a good will is not what we ordinarily have in 
mind when using the term. In our minds, the term ‘good will’ connotes 
benevolence, as in the charitable organization of that name. For Kant, however, a 
good will is not a will that does good;3 it’s a will that does right. A will that does 
right by overcoming its inclinations is what Kant means by “a good will under 
subjective limitations and hindrances”. 
 
One of the most puzzling claims in Kant’s Groundwork is that there is a special 
value in doing one’s duty when one doesn’t want to, a value that doesn’t attach 
to doing one’s duty when it’s something one wants to do anyway. He draws a 
contrast between two shopkeepers, one of whom gives correct change because he 
wants to attract more customers, and the other of whom would prefer to 
shortchange his customers but doesn’t solely because it’s forbidden. The latter 
shopkeeper acts solely from duty, whereas the former acts in accordance with 
duty but from inclination. For this reason, according to Kant, the act of the latter 
shopkeeper has “moral worth”, whereas the action of the former does not (397, 
11).  
     Kant says that the moral worth of actions in which duty overcomes inclination 
is a value “higher” than that of actions in which duty and inclination coincide. 
Many readers take this statement to mean that acts of moral worth are better 
than or preferable to acts that satisfy both duty and inclination — as if it would 
be better if we were averse to doing our duty. This interpretation cannot be right. 
In what sense, then, can the value of moral worth be “higher” than other values? 
     The answer begins with the fact that although Kant denies moral worth to acts 
that merely accord with duty, he does credit such acts with other modes of value. 
Speaking of a case in which someone satisfies his inclinations in doing his duty, 
Kant says that “an action of this kind . . . deserves praise and encouragement but 
                                                
3 “A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to 
attain some proposed end … “ (394, 8). 
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not esteem” (398, 11).4 In other words, the difference between acts done in 
accordance with duty but from inclination, on the one hand, and acts done from 
duty alone, on the other, is that they merit different kinds of appreciation — 
praise and encouragement in the former case, esteem in the latter. A clue to how 
these modes of appreciation differ can be found in Kant’s statement that moral 
worth is not just the highest value but “incomparably the highest”. Thus, esteem 
must regard its object as higher in value without regarding it as better, since 
‘better’ is a term of evaluative comparison and so cannot apply to what is 
incomparable. The question is how a value can be higher than other values 
without being better. 
     Think of the value that siblings have in the eyes of their parents. The parents 
do not cherish any one of their children more than the others, but not because 
they compare the children to one another and find them equally valuable; rather, 
they value each child as special and hence as not to be rated or ranked against 
the others. Indeed, to rank their children in value would already be to devalue 
them, by disregarding their “specialness”, which bars such comparisons. In other 
words, the parents regard each child as incomparably valuable. When Kant says 
that moral worth is incomparably higher than other values, he is saying that it is 
special, precisely in the sense that it must not be ranked against other values, not 
even as better. Kant uses the term ‘esteem’ for a mode of appreciation that 
doesn’t rank its objects but regards them as special; by contrast, praise and 
encouragement are comparative modes of appreciation. 
 
The Structure of the Will 
Kant says next that an action performed solely from duty “has its moral worth 
not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which 
it is decided upon”; he also says that its worth “can lie nowhere else than in the 
principle of the will” (400, 130). As if to explain these statements, he continues: 
                                                
4 The notion of esteem also appears here: “We have, then, to explicate the concept of a will that is 
to be esteemed in itself and that is good apart from any further purpose …” (397, 10). The notion 
that we have other attitudes of approval toward inclinations appears here: “I cannot have respect 
for an inclination as such, whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in the first case 
approve it and in the second even love it … “ (400, 13). 
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“For, the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a 
posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads; and since it must still be 
determined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of 
volition as such when an action is done from duty, where every material 
principle has been withdrawn from it” (ibid.). Unfortunately, this explanation 
seems to cast only shadow on the subject, not light.  
     Let’s start with the concepts of an incentive and a principle of volition. An 
incentive is just something that we want, and our wanting it is what Kant calls an 
inclination. Kant describes incentives as a posteriori because they arise in 
experience. We learn by experience that something is attainable, and then we 
experience an inclination to attain it. 
     Kant says that the will stands between its a posteriori incentive and an a priori 
principle of volition. What is that? Kant never really explains, but here is a 
plausible hypothesis. When we find ourselves with an inclination, we consider 
whether it gives us a reason for acting. Suppose we know that in order to attain 
the object of our inclination — our incentive — we would have to take certain 
steps. We may then consider whether our inclination gives us sufficient reason to 
take those steps. What we are considering is whether there is a valid principle 
endorsing the inclination as a good enough reason for the action.5 
     Recall Kant’s example. A shopkeeper wants to increase his profits without 
working any harder. The only way to do so is to start shortchanging his 
customers. He asks himself whether a desire for easy gain is a good enough 
reason for shortchanging his customers. In asking this question, he is formulating 
a principle of reasoning, like this: “A desire for easy gain is a good enough 
reason to shortchange customers.” Having formulated the principle, he is 
considering whether to base his decision on it — whether, that is, to make it the 
principle of his volition. 
     Kant says that a principle of volition is a priori. He means that it is not derived 
from experience. In that respect, it is like all other principles of reasoning. The 
                                                
5 Kant himself does not use the concept of a reason for acting. Nevertheless, many contemporary 
interpreters regard the concept as essential to an understanding of Kant’s view. 
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principle of non-contradiction, for example, is not gleaned from experience. No 
observation or experiment tells us that the conjunction of a statement and its 
negation (p and not-p) must always be false: we know it without having to 
investigate. Similarly, it is a priori that a desire for an end is a reason for taking 
the means required for attaining it.6 If the only means to easy gain is to 
shortchange one’s customers, then it is a priori that a desire for the one is a reason 
for the other.  
     But is it also a priori that the desire is a good enough reason? That’s the crucial 
question, to which we as yet don’t know the answer. We’ll come back to it 
shortly. 
     The passages quoted above contain one more concept that calls for 
explanation — the concept of a maxim. A maxim is the content of a possible or 
actual decision. The shopkeeper in our example is wondering whether to 
shortchange his customers in the interest of easy gain. “To shortchange my 
customers for easy gain” is the content of a decision that he is wondering 
whether to make, and the content of a possible decision is what Kant calls a 
maxim. If the shopkeeper decides to shortchange his customers for easy gain, 
then he will have “adopted” that maxim. Adopting a maxim is how the will 
decides to act.  
     Here, then, is a diagram of the “crossroads” at which the will of the 
shopkeeper stands: 
A priori THE WILL A posteriori 
Principle: “A desire for easy 
gain is good enough reason to 
shortchange customers.” 
Maxim: “to shortchange 
my customers in the 
interest of easy gain.” 
Inclination: desire for easy 
gain (an incentive).  
 
                                                
6 Some philosophers argue that desiring an end is not a reason for adopting the means to it. (See, for 
example, John Broome, “Wide or Narrow Scope?”, Mind 116 [2007]: 359–370.) Rather, they argue, there 
is a rational requirement either to adopt the means or to give up the end. I disagree, although I must of 
course allow for cases in which giving up the end rationally dominates adopting the means. In my view, a 
desire for the end is indeed a reason for adopting the means, but it is not necessarily a good enough reason. 
There may be better reasons against adopting the means, and reasons against adopting the means for an end 
are also reasons for giving up the end. The difference between these views is that, in mine, there is a 
presumption in favor of adopting the means to a desired end, although that presumption can be overridden.   
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The inclination on the right-hand side is presented to the will in experience. The 
will considers a maxim citing that inclination as a reason (“in the interest of easy 
gain”) for taking an action (“to shortchange my customers”). Adopting the 
maxim would be rational only if the inclination was in fact a good enough reason 
for taking the action. And if it was, the agent would have an a priori principle to 
that effect, as shown on the left-hand side. In considering whether to adopt the 
maxim, then, the will is considering whether there is such a principle on the basis 
of which to adopt the maxim, as the will is inclined to do. 
     Assume for the sake of simplicity that a desire for easy gain is the 
shopkeeper’s one and only inclination: it’s all he wants in life, at least for the 
moment. Giving correct change to his customers will therefore entail acting 
contrary to every inclination he has. If he does give correct change, in that case, 
he will be performing an act of moral worth. (We are assuming that giving 
correct change is the right thing to do. It is the right thing, of course, but we don’t 
yet know why it is, and so we can only assume so.) 7 But what reason can the 
shopkeeper have for giving correct change? The only inclination he has is a 
reason for giving incorrect change. He has no inclination that can be cited as a 
reason for doing the opposite. His reason, and the principle endorsing it, must 
therefore come from somewhere else. But from where? 
 
The Formula of Universal Law 
In reply to this question, Kant says that in an act of moral worth, “there is left for 
the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the law and 
subjectively pure respect for this practical law” (400–401, 13–14). The sudden 
appearance of law at this point is puzzling, but in order to solve the puzzle, we 
must press ahead to an even greater puzzle. Here it is:8 
                                                
7 In making this assumption, we are following Kant’s own method of proceeding from ordinary moral 
consciousness to moral philosophy. (See the title of Part I of the Groundwork.) 
8 420–421, 31: “When I think of a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know beforehand what it will 
contain; I do not know this until I am given the condition. But when I think of a categorical imperative I 
know at once what it contains. For, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that 
the maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, 
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   But what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, 
even without regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called 
good absolutely and without limitation? Since I have deprived the will of every 
impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law, nothing is left but the conformity 
of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, 
that is I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law. [402, 14–15] 
The only way to make sense of this passage is to think through the prior puzzle 
that it is meant to solve. 
     Let’s revisit the shopkeeper as he considers shortchanging his customers. He 
considers this option by considering whether to adopt the maxim “to 
shortchange my customers in the interest of easy gain”. Now, since we are 
assuming that it would be wrong to shortchange his customers, we must also 
assume that his inclination is not good enough reason for doing so. We must 
therefore assume that the agent is somehow blocked from finding an a priori 
principle endorsing his inclination as a sufficient reason. Why he is blocked 
remains to be explained. For the moment, however, the question is what 
principle of volition he can have instead. The principle we’re looking for will be 
the one that determines him to perform an act of moral worth by giving correct 
change, out of duty and contrary to his one and only inclination. What can that 
principle be? 
     The answer is hiding in plain sight. If the agent is to perform an act of moral 
worth, then his action will have to be determined by something other than 
inclination: it will have to be determined by a principle. In most cases, an agent’s 
principle tells him that his inclination is a good enough reason for acting. But the 
agent in the present case has no such reason, since his one and only inclination, 
we are assuming, isn’t good enough.  All he has, then, is the idea of a good 
enough reason, with nothing to satisfy it, a concept with no instances. If his 
action is to be determined by a principle, as it must if he is to act contrary to 
inclination, then his principle will have to be fashioned out of the materials at 
hand, hence out of the mere idea of a good enough reason. What principle can be 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law as such; and this 
conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as necessary.” 
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fashioned out of that? It will have to be the principle of not acting without a good 
enough reason. 
     Thus, when the shopkeeper lacks a principle endorsing his inclination as a 
good enough reason to give short change, he must gain access to a principle 
telling him not to act on that inclination — not to give short change — precisely 
because his inclination is not a good enough reason to do so. And how can he not 
give short change, except by giving correct change? His act of moral worth must 
therefore be based on the principle of not acting without a good enough reason. 
     But what constitutes a good enough reason? Whatever constitutes a reason 
must be covered by a principle of reasoning, a principle that sanctions the 
transition from that reason to its conclusion — or, in this context, to the action for 
which it is a reason. In this context, then, a good reason for acting is an 
inclination for which there is a principle validating it as such. Not to act without 
a reason therefore amounts to not acting without an inclination for which there is 
a validating principle. 
     This principle bears a resemblance to Kant’s statement that “I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal 
law”. The shopkeeper is considering a maxim that proposes an action (giving 
short change) and a reason for that action (a desire for easy gain). He looks for a 
principle to validate the reason proposed in his maxim. At this point, he might be 
described as trying to turn the maxim into a law — for example, by turning the 
maxim “to shortchange my customers for easy gain” into the principle “A desire 
for easy gain is a good enough reason to shortchange customers.” We don’t yet 
see why he might fail in his attempt to turn his maxim into a law, but we have 
seen that if he fails, he will be left with the bare concept of a good enough reason, 
plus a principle directing him not to adopt a maxim that doesn’t propose one, or 
in other words, a maxim whose proposed reason is not validated by a principle 
of reasoning. Thus, he ought not to act on the maxim if he cannot turn it into a 
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law, exactly as Kant says.9 
 
Kant thinks of himself at this point as having established a string of conditional 
conclusions:  
i. If we have any duties, then we must be able to do something that goes 
against our inclinations — to do it just because it’s required. 
ii. If we act in opposition to our inclinations, then our action must be 
determined instead by a principle.  
iii. If our principle doesn’t endorse any inclinations as good enough 
reasons, then it must contain the mere, un-instantiated idea of a good 
enough reason. 
iv. If a principle contains no more than the un-instantiated idea of a good 
enough reason, then it must be the principle of not acting without a 
good enough reason — or in other words, without a reason endorsed 
as such by a principle of reasoning. 
Stringing these conditionals together, we get the conclusion that if we have any 
duties, then in some cases we must act on a last-ditch principle of volition, which 
tells us not to act without a principle validating the reason proposed in our 
maxim. This alst-ditch principle of volition must be the one on which we proceed 
when we go against all of our inclinations, as we do when our action has moral 
worth. 
     You may not have realized it, but we have now derived the content of our 
duty from the very concept of a duty. For we have discovered the one and only 
principle on which we can act against our inclinations, as duty sometimes 
requires us and must then enable us to do. When we act against our inclinations, 
what requires and enables us to do so is the principle of not acting without a 
reason endorsed by a principle of reasoning. So we have one and only one duty 
— that is, if we have any duties at all. Our duty is to act on a maxim only if we 
                                                
9 The formula “Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be universal law” is called 
the Categorical Imperative. Kant and his interpreters spend much time explaining why it is an imperative 
and in what sense it is categorical. My interpretation skips over those issues, thus departing from both the 
text and its standard interpretations. 
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also have a principle endorsing the reason specified in that maxim as sufficient 
for the specified action. 
     Looking back on the argument thus far, we can see why Kant was so 
interested in acts of moral worth, in which duty must overcome all inclination. 
These acts are the ones in which duty must be the sole determinant of our will, 
with inclination playing no part. But if inclination plays no part in determining 
our will, then all there is to determine it is a principle of volition, which must 
therefore be the embodiment of our duty. And there turns out to be only one 
principle of volition that can determine our will to oppose all of our inclinations 
— namely, the principle of not acting on inclinations without a principle of 
volition endorsing them as good enough reason to act. That principle must 
therefore embody our one and only duty. I will therefore call it the principle of 
duty (though that’s not Kant’s term).      
     Many questions remain. Why does Kant say that we must be able to will that 
our maxim become universal law? And what does he mean in calling the 
presumptive law universal? Most importantly, why can’t the shopkeeper will his 
easy-money maxim to become a universal law? Let’s start with this last question. 
 
Contradictions in Conception 
Earlier we considered the law of non-contradiction as a principle of reasoning. 
We said that it is a priori in the sense that it isn’t gleaned from observation or 
experimentation or any other kind of experience. Its validity is obvious to us 
simply upon reflection.  
     What’s more, the validity of this principle is obvious to any creature10 that is 
capable of reasoning. A creature cannot reason unless it regards the law of non-
contradiction as valid. A creature that had to learn the validity of this law from 
experience wouldn’t be able to learn it at all, because learning it from experience 
would require reasoning that already treated the law as valid. 
                                                
10 I find the word ‘creature’ less awkward than the word ‘being’. Strictly speaking, however, a 
creature is a created being, and Kant’s theory applies also to beings that aren’t created — for 
example, to God. 
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     The fact that the validity of this principle is obvious to any reasoning creature 
is also obvious to any such creature. In short, everyone knows that the principle 
is valid, everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on. The principle’s 
validity is, as we say, common knowledge among creatures capable of reasoning. 
That’s the sense in which the principle is universal. 
     Being universal in this sense is essential to the authority of principles and 
essential to their being a priori. Imagine that when you reflected on the law of 
non-contradiction, you saw it as valid for your reasoning but you weren’t sure 
whether others would see it as valid for theirs. You would have to wonder 
whether you shouldn’t be looking at the matter from their point-of-view instead 
of your own. For all you knew, your point-of-view on the validity of this 
principle might be like a literal, physical point-of-view, from which some things 
are visible that aren’t visible from other points-of-view, and vice versa. You 
would have to think: Maybe other people can see a problem with the principle 
that I can’t see. The principle would lack authority over your reasoning, since 
you could always imagine getting around it by resorting to a different point-of-
view.  
   In reality, the principle of non-contradiction has authority in your eyes because 
you can see that there is no getting around it — no vantage point from which it 
doesn’t hold, or from which their appears to be a vantage point from which it 
doesn’t hold, and so on. It has authority, in short, because it is common 
knowledge among reasoners, yourself included.      
     Note that the universality of this principle is not represented in the principle’s 
content. The principle of non-contradiction doesn’t say that contradictions are 
false for everyone, or that no one should accept a contradiction, or that anyone who 
considers a contradiction should reject it. The principle is universal because 
everyone finds it valid for his own reasoning, and knows that everyone likewise 
finds it valid. It’s universal, in other words, because its validity is common 
knowledge. 
     Principles of practical reasoning can be universal in the same sense. One 
example is the principle of instrumental reasoning, which says that having an 
12 
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end is a reason for adopting means to its attainment. 11 Everyone knows, and 
everyone knows that everyone knows, that the shopkeeper’s end of easy gain is a 
reason for him to adopt some sufficient means to his end.  
     But the instrumental principle says only that having an end is a reason for 
adopting the means. The question remains, in any particular case, whether 
having the end is a good enough reason — good enough to act on, that is. What the 
shopkeeper needs is a principle to the effect that his end provides, not just a 
reason for giving short change, the means that he has proposed, but a reason 
that’s good enough. 
     Suppose that the latter were a universal principle whose validity was common 
knowledge — evident to all, as was evident to all, and so on. In that case, it 
would be obvious to any profit-seeking shopkeeper that his desire for easy gain 
was a good enough reason for shortchanging his customers; and its being 
obvious to him would be obvious to all of his customers. But then all his 
customers would find it obvious that their own financial interests were good 
enough reason to count their change carefully — in which case, shortchanging 
them would be impossible. So if the end of easy gain were a good enough reason 
for the shopkeeper to shortchange his customers, then he would not be able to 
shortchange them, after all. Shortchanging customers and having good enough 
reason for doing so are incompatible.  
     We have now discovered why the easy-money maxim cannot become a 
principle of reasoning, or in Kant’s terms, a universal law. If there were such a 
principle, then the maxim would be a proposal to do something that was 
obviously impossible, and so the principle would be self-defeating. The shop-
keeper who considers the easy-money maxim therefore finds himself without a 
viable principle, and he must fall back on the principle of duty, which tells him 
not to act on his inclination, because he has no principle validating it as a good 
                                                
11 This principle roughly corresponds to Kant’s Hypothetical Imperative. But it is not in imperatival form, 
and it uses the concept of a reason for acting — two respects in which it departs from the text and from 
standard interpretations. It is also controversial among contemporary theorists of practical reasoning. See 
note 6, below. 
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enough reason for acting. 
 
Suppose I want you to think that I am the author of the leading textbook on 
Kantian ethics. Since there is no evidence of my having written any such book, I 
will just have to tell you that I have, in the hope that you will believe me. My 
maxim will then be as follows: “to tell people that I authored a book in order to 
get them to believe it”. If my maxim became a universal law, it would read as 
follows: “A desire to get people to believe something is good enough reason for 
telling it to them”. 
     If there were such a law, then everyone would know, and would know that 
everyone knew, that wanting to be credited with authorship of a book was good 
enough reason for claiming it. Yet if I claim something, and you understand 
what I say, then you will already know that I want you to believe it. And if you 
also knew that this end, by itself, was good enough reason for making the claim, 
and that I knew it too, then you would know that I would still make the claim 
even if I didn’t think it was true. In that case, you wouldn’t believe me, and so 
making the claim wouldn’t be a means of convincing you, after all. Thus, if the 
reason stated in my maxim were endorsed by a universal law, then it wouldn’t be 
a reason for the proposed action. Wanting people to believe something would 
not really be a reason for claiming it if it were endorsed as a good enough reason 
by an a priori principle of reasoning.12 Such a principle would therefore be self-
defeating, and so there cannot be one. Lacking a viable principle on which to tell 
you this lie, I must fall back on the principle of duty, which forbids me to tell it. 
      Next suppose that a friend asks me to keep his valuables safe while he goes 
off to climb Mount Everest.13 And suppose that he is killed in an avalanche, 
                                                
12 Having discovered that my maxim cannot be fashioned into a universal principle, I might try to revise it. 
I might say, “Oh, I don’t care whether you believe what I’m saying; I just like the sound of it, and you 
happen to be nearby.” I now have a maxim that can be universalized. But I have taken a clearly illegitimate 
step. I have revised my maxim in order to get around the fact that it can’t be universalized; and I have done 
so by trying to believe something that I know to be untrue. This step has a maxim of its own, which cannot 
be universalized. 
13 This example is adapted from one that appears, not in the Groundwork, but in Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason (27, 27). See also Kant’s essay “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of 
No Practical Use”, in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett 
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leaving no record of what he had deposited with me for safekeeping. Suppose, 
finally, that I would like to keep his valuables for myself, despite his having heirs 
to whom I could return them. My maxim would go like this: “to conceal the fact 
of a deposit in the interest of keeping it for myself”. A universal law fashioned 
from this maxim would go like this: “Wanting to keep a deposit is good enough 
reason for concealing it.” 
     If there were such a law, then everyone would know, and would know that 
everyone one knew, that wanting to keep a deposit was good enough reason for 
concealing it. But then prospective depositors would know that their prospective 
trustees would have good enough reason for concealing their deposits, and so 
they would either make no deposits or leave a record of them with reliable 
proxies. If wanting to keep a deposit were good enough reason for concealing it, 
then concealing a deposit would be impossible, since no deposit would be made 
without being recorded. Again, a principle endorsing the inclination as a 
sufficient reason would be self-defeating; hence there can be no such principle; 
and so I am left with the principle of duty, which tells me not to act without a 
principle. 
 
When I find that I cannot fashion a maxim into a principle of reasoning, I am 
thrown back upon a principle of last resort, which tells me not to act without a 
principle.14 As we have seen, this last-ditch principle embodies the one and only 
duty I have, if I have any duties at all. Oddly enough, my duty turns out to be a 
principle on which I act as a last resort, when I can find no other principle to act 
on.  
                                                                                                                                            
Publishing, 1983, 61–92, pp. 69–70 . It is significant in that the example cannot be interpreted as relying on 
the consequences of a universal practice, since the practice in this case would be one of concealment that 
would never be discovered. 
14 The main idea of this section is due to Melis Erdur. It constitutes a significant departure from standard 
interpretations of Kant, according to which the Categorical Imperative is always present, at least implicitly, 
in a moral agent’s practical reasoning. According to Erdur’s interpretation, the Imperative comes into play 
only when the agent’s inclinations must be resisted for the sake of duty — hence only when it provides the 
basis for an action of moral worth. In the present interpretation, the Imperative then comes into play as a 
principle of volition, here described as the “principle of last resort”. What is always present in an agent’s 
practical reasoning, rather than the Categorical Imperative, is the agent’s respect for his own autonomy, 
which moves him to act on principles of reasoning rather than merely on inclinations. (See the sections 
titled “Autonomy” and “An End in Itself”, below.)   
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     That’s why Kant draws such a sharp distinction between acting from duty 
alone and acting in accordance with duty but out of inclination. In the latter sort 
of action, my duty is out of sight, even out of mind. I have a principle endorsing 
my inclinations as good enough reasons, and I act on that principle, by acting for 
those reasons, without a second thought. Only when I cannot fashion a principle 
endorsing my inclinations do I fall back on duty as my principle of volition. Only 
then does my action have moral content, as Kant puts it (398, 11), for only then is 
my action informed by duty as its principle.15 Otherwise, my action is not about 
morality at all. 
     You might think that even when I act on a principle endorsing my inclinations 
as providing sufficient reason, I am also acting partly from duty, which enjoins 
me never to act without such a principle. Not so. I am indeed acting in 
accordance with duty, because I have a principle that endorses my inclinations, 
and such a principle is just what duty requires me to have. But I do not act on the 
basis of duty’s requirement until I find myself without a principle to endorse my 
inclinations, at which point the command of duty becomes my principle, on the 
basis of which I resist my inclinations. Provided that I have a principle endorsing 
those inclinations, however, I can follow them on the basis of that principle, 
without a thought for my duty.16 
     Of course, there must be something that induces me to make duty my 
principle when all else fails, but it cannot be duty itself. I don’t have a duty to 
make duty my principle when all else fails, since I couldn’t act from such a duty 
unless I had already made duty my principle. Why, then, do I make duty my 
principle when all else fails? We are not yet in a position to answer this question.  
                                                
15 Note that the German phrase Moralischer Wert can be translated “moral significance”: actions performed 
on the principle of duty have moral significance, precisely because they have moral content. 
16 This element of the interpretation begins to answer an objection that some commentators have raised to 
Kant’s theory. Their objection is that the theory requires an agent always to have at least one eye on his 
duty, thereby entertaining “one thought too many”. (The phrase comes from Bernard Williams, “Persons, 
Character and Morality”, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1981], p. 119.) Under the present interpretation, duty does not come into view until it is 
needed to restrain the agent from following his inclinations. Of course, it remains to be explained why the 
principle of duty, or any ordinary principle, enters into the agent’s thinking, to begin with. That explanation 
will be provided in the sections titled “Autonomy” and “An End in Itself”, below. 
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     Note, in any case, that acts with moral content are always acts of omission, 
acts of not doing something because I cannot frame a principle endorsing my 
inclinations as providing good enough reason to do it. If a shopkeeper 
reluctantly gives correct change out of duty, he is, strictly speaking, not giving 
short change, as he is inclined to do; if I reluctantly inform my friend’s heirs of 
his deposit, I am, strictly speaking, not following my inclination to conceal it. 
Acting from duty is always a matter of not acting from inclination, on the 
grounds that my inclinations do not give me good enough reason to act. 
 
Willing the Law 
In each of these cases, the defeated reason really is a reason for acting. Wanting 
easy gain really is a reason for shortchanging customers; wanting people to 
believe something really is a reason for telling it to them; wanting to keep a 
deposit really is a reason for concealing it. Liars and crooks are not mistaken to 
treat these ends as reasons for lying and stealing. Their mistake is in treating 
these reasons as good enough.17 Wanting people to believe something isn’t a 
good enough reason for asserting it unless one believes it to be true. Wanting 
money or valuables isn’t a good enough reason for holding on to them unless 
they don’t belong to anyone else. 
     These extra conditions — that valuables don’t belong to others, or that an 
assertion is believe to be true — are needed for the sufficiency of reasons based 
on the inclinations of these agents. Thus, an agent’s deliberations are not 
complete if he has merely surveyed his inclinations and balanced up the reasons 
they provide; he must also consider whether there are any additional conditions 
required for the sufficiency of those reasons.  
     How, then, can an agent tell when the reasons he has found are sufficient 
under the circumstances? Reasons for acting carry no seal of sufficiency 
                                                
17 In the following sections, Kant’s notion that agents “will the law” is interpreted in terms of what might 
be called the “sufficiency clause” in principles of volition. According to this interpretation, agents do not 
decide what counts as a reason, but they do decide whether their proposed reasons are “good enough” for 
their proposed action: they decide that their reasons are good enough by terminating deliberation, which is 
something that they must simply do. This interpretation of “willing the law” is non-standard, and there is no 
direct evidence for it in the text.    
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guaranteeing that they’re good enough. Nor do they carry on their face any 
indication of which further conditions, if any, would be needed to make them 
sufficient. It seems as if the agent must simply call a halt to his deliberations at 
some point and declare “Good enough!”  
     The necessity of calling a halt to deliberation also arises in the context of 
consequentialist theories, such as Utilitarianism, where the agent could in 
principle go on forever imagining alternative actions and their possible 
consequences. Continuing this process or stopping it are themselves alternative 
actions whose consequences the agent could go on imagining forever. And the 
process of deliberating whether to stop deliberating about whether to stop 
deliberating — that process could go on forever, too. At some point, the agent 
must simply stop deliberating and act. 
     The problem is that whether to terminate deliberation appears to be arbitrary, 
because it cannot be based on deliberation. Consequentialists have no 
satisfactory solution to the problem. Kant thinks that he has one.  
 
We have already seen a part of Kant’s solution. When one declares that reasons 
are good enough, one purports to state a principle of reasoning, which must be 
common knowledge among all reasoners. And some purported principles could 
not be common knowledge, since their being so would undermine them, by 
making the specified action impossible or canceling the specified reasons. If an 
agent proposes to perform that action for those reasons, he will encounter an 
obstacle to declaring them good enough, namely, that his declaration cannot 
embody a principle of reasoning, because such a principle would be self-
defeating. 
     What about the remaining reasons for acting — the ones for which a 
declaration of their sufficiency could embody a principle of reasoning? It’s not 
enough that there could be such a principle. The mere possibility of an a priori 
principle declaring these reasons to be good enough cannot make them so; there 
must actually be such a principle that is common knowledge among reasoners. 
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As we have seen, however, reasons do not bear any obvious mark of sufficiency. 
How can there be common knowledge about something that isn’t obvious?   
     Intractable as this problem may seem, it belongs to a class of problems that 
can in fact be solved.18 Here is an analogous case. Suppose that a demonstration 
has been called for noon, but the organizers neglected to say where it will take 
place. Everyone wants to gather with the others in one place, but there has been 
no public announcement about where to gather. Each person in town will go 
wherever he thinks the others will go, but he knows that each of the others will 
be guided likewise, by where he thinks that others will go. How can anyone 
figure out where to go? What’s needed is common knowledge of a gathering 
place, where everyone can go with confidence that everyone will go there. 
     Now suppose that there is a square in the middle of town. Obviously, that’s 
where everyone will gather, but not because it has been publicly designated as 
the gathering place. Everyone will gather in the square simply because there is 
common knowledge that everyone wants to gather in one place and the square is 
the most salient place for a gathering. It doesn’t have a “Gather Here” sign that 
everyone can see, but everyone can see that it sticks out, in the eyes of those 
wanting to gather, as if suggesting itself as site for their demonstration. Thus, 
common knowledge of a universal desire to converge, plus a uniquely salient 
point of convergence, can produce common knowledge that convergence will 
occur at that point. 
     In this example there is an ultimate, physical convergence, as demonstrators 
flock to the town square. But there is also a prior, intellectual convergence 
consisting in common knowledge about where the physical convergence will 
occur. Demonstrators converge physically because they know that the square is 
where everyone will converge, that everyone knows it, and so on. So before they 
                                                
18 In what follows, “willing the law” is interpreted as a matter of terminating deliberation by declaring 
one’s reasons to be good enough, where that declaration qualifies as a principle of reasoning — hence a law 
— because it is common knowledge among reasoners. How such a declaration can be common knowledge 
is then explained in terms of a co-ordination problem among reasoners who seek common knowledge about 
when reasons are good enough. And the willing involved in willing the law is taken to consist in the 
willingness of reasoners to converge on some coordination points rather than others. This interpretation has 
virtually no support in the text, but it does manage to reconstruct many features of Kant’s view — for 
example, his notion of a Kingdom of Ends.  
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meet in the square, they have already reached a meeting of the minds about 
where they will meet. 
     Practical reasoners are in a somewhat similar situation — except that the 
ultimate convergence they seek is just a meeting of minds. Each reasoner aims to 
stop deliberating at a point where his reasons are endorsed as sufficient by a 
principle that is common knowledge. Like the townspeople who need a 
gathering point that’s common knowledge, practical reasoners need principles of 
reasoning that are common knowledge; and like the townspeople, they need to 
arrive at common knowledge without any obvious signpost or signal.  
     Practical reasoners aren’t hoping to converge on a single principle; rather, 
they are hoping that, with respect to any proposed principle, they will converge 
on either accepting or rejecting it. They must therefore hope that for any 
proposed principle, either acceptance or rejection will be the uniquely salient 
point of convergence. If either acceptance or rejection is the salient point of 
convergence for a given principle, then their converging on that point will 
already be common knowledge, given common knowledge of their need to 
converge, just as the salience of the town square already produces common 
knowledge that the square is where people will gather. And if it is common 
knowledge that reasoners will converge on accepting a principle, then the 
principle itself will be common knowledge, and so it will qualify as a genuine 
principle of reasoning; whereas if their converging on its rejection is common 
knowledge, then it won’t qualify as a principle of reasoning.  
     How could acceptance or rejection of a principle achieve salience as a point of 
convergence among reasoners? Well, rejection of a principle can be salient if 
convergence on acceptance would obviously be undesirable.19 
     Here is an analogy. Suppose that our imaginary town has both a courthouse 
square and a market square, equally salient as places for people to gather. And 
imagine that the market square is obviously too small for a demonstration: 
convergence on that square would cause a riot and a stampede. The market’s 
                                                
19 If the principle would be self-defeating, then all of this reasoning about convergence is 
unecessary, since there cannot be a self-defeating principle. 
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obvious undesirability as a place for demonstrators to converge produces 
common knowledge that it won’t be the site of the demonstration. In the same 
way, there can be principles of reasoning whose acceptance would be obviously 
undesirable as point for practical reasoners to converge.  
     An example will help. 
 
Contradictions in the Will 
Suppose that you and I find ourselves in circumstances where each would lose 
something by cooperating with the other, no matter what the other does, but 
would lose even more from the other's failure to cooperate.  The cooperation at 
issue might be helping to harvest one another's fields or (to invoke the relevant 
cliché) merely scratching one another's backs. In these circumstances, neither of 
us has anything to gain from helping the other, whether or not the other helps 
us, and both of us therefore face the prospect of the other's refusing to help. We 
might wish that we could escape the dilemma through an exchange of mutually 
dependent offers of the form "I will cooperate if you will." Unfortunately, the 
resulting agreement would generate a second-order dilemma, since each of us 
would lose by following through on the agreement, though he would lose even 
more from the other's refusal to follow through. 
     It is common knowledge between us that self-interest gives both of us reasons 
against cooperating. But are reasons of self-interest sufficient? Might self-interest 
be trumped by other considerations? We aren’t sure, and each is fairly sure that 
the other isn’t sure, either, since self-interest doesn’t bear a mark of sufficiency on 
its face. Hence neither of us is sure whether his reasons of self-interest are 
sufficient, not only because of his own doubts but also because of the doubts that 
he suspects are entertained by the other, which prevent the necessary principle 
from becoming common knowledge. Yet in order to find good enough reason for 
choosing one way or the other, we must have common knowledge as to what 
those reasons are; otherwise, nothing will count as good enough reason either 
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     Now, it is common knowledge between us that, in order to have sufficient 
reasons for choosing one way or the other, we need to arrive at common 
knowledge about what such reasons might be in circumstances like ours. And 
where there is common knowledge of a need to coordinate, coordination can 
occur, provided that there is a salient point of convergence whose salience as 
such is common knowledge. What is the salient point of convergence as to the 
reasons whether to cooperate in this case?  
     Well, self-interest gives each of us reason to prefer that, if we are to converge 
somewhere, then we converge on cooperating, since each will gain more from 
the other’s cooperation than he will lose by his own. Refusing to cooperate is like 
the market square that would be an undesirable meeting place on which to 
converge, and whose undesirability as such is common knowledge.  So 
cooperation is like the courthouse square — the most salient point of 
convergence as to what there is good enough reason to do in such a dilemma. 
Starting from a lack of common knowledge as to whether reasons of self-interest 
are trumped by other considerations, we arrive at common knowledge that they 
are, because it is common knowledge between us that we need to arrive at 
common knowledge on the question, and answering in the affirmative is the 
salient point of convergence.  
 
Here is another example. As you walk down the street, you pass a beggar who 
asks for a dollar. You believe that he is genuinely in need, but you are saving up 
for a vacation and decide not to help him. Do you have a principle on which to 
make this decision? 
     Your maxim in this case is “to withhold help from a needy person in the 
interest of saving money”. The corresponding principle would be “Wanting to 
save money is good enough reason for withholding help from someone in need.” 
Is that principle common knowledge?  
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     It certainly could be common knowledge.20 Refusing to help someone in need 
would still be possible if there were common knowledge that the desire to save 
was a good enough reason for such a refusal; and the desire would still be a 
reason for refusing even if its being a good enough reason were common 
knowledge. So the proposed principle wouldn’t be self-defeating.  
     But whether it is a principle of reasoning isn’t obvious. The desire to save 
money is obviously a reason for refusing to help someone in need, but it may or 
may not be good enough: there is nothing on the face of the desire to produce 
common knowledge that it is or is not a sufficient reason. You and your fellow 
practical reasoners are therefore on your own, as it were, when it comes to 
arriving at common knowledge on the subject. But like the townspeople who 
want to gather for a demonstration, you can reach a meeting of the minds on 
your own. 
     You and other reasoners need to have common knowledge as to whether a 
desire to save is good enough reason for refusing to help others in need. You 
therefore need to converge either on accepting or on rejecting a principle to that 
effect. So you must consider whether the salient point of convergence is to accept 
the principle or to reject it. But everyone would find it undesirable for there to be 
convergence on the principle that a desire to save was a good enough reason for 
refusing to help the needy. For everyone would see that such convergence would 
entail that he himself would suffer in case of need.21 No one would want 
everyone to converge on refusing to help him because of a desire to save. 
     The universal undesirability of converging on acceptance of this principle is 
obvious. Rejecting the principle is therefore salient as the point of convergence 
for agents who seek a meeting of the minds, just as avoiding the market square is 
salient for the townspeople who seek to gather for a demonstration. There is 
                                                
20 424, 33: “Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even by thought without contradiction 
as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become such. In the case of others that 
inner impossibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to 
the universality of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself.” 
21 See also 415, 26: “There is . . . one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all rational beings 
. . . and therefore one purpose that they not merely could have but that we can safely presuppose that they 
all actually do have by a natural necessity, and that purpose is happiness.” 
23 
 
Reading Kant’s Groundwork ~12.viii.2011 
consequently common knowledge that the principle of stinginess fails to qualify 
as a principle of reasoning, and hence that the reason proposed in your maxim of 
stinginess is not a good enough reason, after all.22 
 
There is one important difference between these Kantian examples and the 
example of converging on the town square. In that case, knowledge of the salient 
point of convergence depended on empirical information. In order to know that 
the town had a square, and that it was the obvious place to gather, you would 
need to have seen the town, or read about it, or learned about it in some other 
way. So what was common knowledge among the townspeople couldn’t be 
common knowledge among all reasoners wherever they might live. 
     But a principle of reasoning that specifies what counts as a sufficient reason 
for acting must be common knowledge among all creatures capable of acting for 
reasons — that is, among all agents — just as the principle of logic must be 
common knowledge among all thinkers. That’s why the Kantian cases rely only 
on concepts such as ‘self-interest’ and ‘need’, which any rational agent must 
have. 
                                                
22 You might have a somewhat weaker maxim of stinginess, for which the corresponding 
principle would not be undesirable as a point of convergence. It’s the maxim “in the interest of 
saving money, to do only my fair share of charity”. If the corresponding principle were common 
knowledge, then everyone would judge himself to have sufficient reason for refusing to give, but 
only after he had given his fair share. And if everyone thought he had reason to stop giving only 
at that point, then no one would be left in need. (Leave aside for present purposes what counts as 
a “fair share”.) 
     So is it common knowledge that a desire to save money is a good enough reason to do no 
more than one’s fair share of charity? That principle could be common knowledge without 
undermining itself; and its being common knowledge would not be undesirable. Hence rejecting 
the principle isn’t salient as a point of convergence. But what about accepting it? Surely, there are 
cases in which a universal desire to converge is frustrated by the lack of a salient point. (What if 
the town had no central square?) 
     Practical reasoning is not such a case. Principles of reasoning are proposed for the sake of 
endorsing inclinations as providing good enough reason to act. Everyone wants to follow his 
inclinations, conditionally on their providing sufficient reason for doing so. Accepting principles 
that endorse inclinations is therefore the salient point of convergence, by default, barring 
conditions that shift salience to rejecting them. When practical reasoners seek common 
knowledge about the sufficiency of reasons, accepting them as sufficient is the salient point on 
which to converge. 
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     Thus, although you may be asking yourself whether to scratch the back of 
someone who has just scratched yours, or whether to put money into a beggar’s 
cup, you needn’t know anything about backs or cups in order to find the answer; 
indeed, if you do know anything about them, you mustn’t rely on it. You must 
think about your situation in terms that any rational agent could understand. In 
the first case, the relevant description of your situation is simply that each of two 
people could gain something by refusing to act but would lose even more if the 
other refuses; in the second case, it’s that an agent has needs that others could 
alleviate. The specific, real-world details are irrelevant. 
 
The last few sections have offered an interpretation of Kant’s notion that we 
must be able to will the principle of reasoning that corresponds to our maxim — 
or, as he puts it, that we must be able to will our maxim as a universal law. When 
Kant expresses this notion, he seems to be suggesting that an agent can will a 
principle of reasoning into existence — that an agent can conjure up such a 
principle by an act of will. This suggestion would be absurd. A principle of 
reasoning must be common knowledge among all reasoners, and no individual 
agent can create common knowledge just by willing it to exist. 
     But Kant doesn’t mean to suggest otherwise. When he says that we must be 
able to will our maxim as a universal law, he means that practical reasoners must 
be willing and able to converge on the relevant principle, given the aim of 
common knowledge about the sufficiency of reasons. If convergence on the 
principle is neither impossible nor obviously undesirable, then the principle is 
salient as a point of convergence, agents therefore converge on it, and so it really 
is common knowledge. And we must act on principles that are common 
knowledge and that consequently qualify as genuine principles of reasoning. 
     Thus, we don’t create common knowledge of a principle by an act of will; 
rather, a principle is common knowledge because we and other agents would be 
willing to converge on it in our search for common knowledge about reasons for 
acting. The will enters into creating principles of practical reasoning indirectly, 
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by making them salient as points of spontaneous convergence among practical 
reasoners.    
Freedom 
Let us now return to a question that we have three times postponed, namely, 
why we act on principles of reasoning in the first place, including, as a last resort, 
the principle of duty. In order to answer this question, we have to delve into 
Kant’s theory of freedom.  
     We are concrete beings whose behavior is governed by laws of physics, 
chemistry, biology, and psychology. Yet if we were no more than such beings, 
we wouldn’t be agents, or so Kant believes. We would still move around, but the 
wind and waves move around, too. What distinguishes agents from the wind 
and waves is that agent choose how to act, and Kant thinks that choosing how to 
act requires freedom from the laws governing concrete cause-and-effect. 
     As before, let us consider this possibility in the case of theoretical reasoning 
before turning to the practical case. Why, when I am asked the sum of 2 and 2, do 
I say “Four”? If you consider me from the outside, as a human organism, you 
will say that I have a brain, hooked to ears on one end and a mouth on the other, 
like a flesh-and-blood computer hooked to input and output devices. The 
question goes in my ears, the nerve impulses go round and round in my brain, 
and the answer comes out of my mouth. The question produces my answer by a 
mechanism of cause-and-effect.  
     From my internal perspective, however, the process looks quite different. I 
don’t submit your question to some inner mechanism and wait for the answer to 
emerge. If I did, I couldn’t be sure the answer was right until I had checked the 
mechanism for loose connections, whereas I know the sum of 2 and 2 a priori. 
From my perspective, I add 2 and 2 by thinking in the abstract about the number 
2, the function of addition, and the number 4. And the answer 4 isn’t issued to 
me by any mechanism; I volunteer the answer, so to speak, and I volunteer the 
answer “Four” because it’s the right one.  
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     This ‘because’ is not the ‘because’ of causation. The ‘because’ of causation 
does appear in your explanation of my answer. From your perspective, I answer 
“Four” because of the process by which nerve impulses are channeled through 
my brain — “because” of this process in the sense of being caused by it. But 
when I say that I answer “Four” because it’s the right answer, I mean that I 
volunteer that answer because I grasp the relations among abstract objects — the 
numbers 2 and 4, and the function of addition — which don't participate in 
cause-and-effect. My ‘because’ indicates what justifies my answer, not what 
causes it.       
      Turning now to the case of practical reasoning, we can see that Kant’s view 
characterizes me as free in the same sense, at least when I act on a principle. 
When I consider a proposed reason for acting, I must ask myself whether it is 
validated by a principle of reasoning. If I answer Yes, it’s because reasoners 
would converge on that answer, and here “because” expresses justification, not 
causation. There isn’t an actual convergence of reasoners answering Yes in 
unison and causing me to give that answer, too; there is just my own abstract 
reasoning that justifies my volunteering that answer. Acting on a principle thus 
enables me to win free of cause-and-effect — from my own, internal perspective, 
at least, if not from that of an external observer. 
     Kant says that freedom is autonomy.23 What he means, according to my 
interpretation, is that we are free insofar as we act on justifications, which consist 
in abstract principles, which Kant calls laws. The process of framing principles 
on which to act is what Kant calls giving ourselves a law. And giving a law to 
oneself is autonomy in the etymologically correct sense of the term, since autos is 
Greek for “self” and nomos is Greek for “law”. That’s why Kant says that 
freedom is autonomy. 
 
We are now in a position to answer a question that we earlier postponed, about 
my motive for acting on principles. Why do I look for a principle to validate the 
                                                
23 “What, then, can freedom of the will be other than autonomy, that is, the will's property of being a law to 
itself?” (51, 447). 
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reason proposed in my maxim, and why, failing such a principle, do I fall back 
on the last-ditch principle forbidding me to act? The answer is that I aspire to be 
a free agent, which I can become by acting on justifications, embodied in self-
given principles, which in Kant’s terminology are self-given laws. Thus, I aspire 
to freedom in the form of autonomy. I aspire to freedom, in the form of 
autonomy, out of respect for the agent I would be if I were autonomous and 
therefore free, and for the agent I already am in having that aspiration. I act on 
principle, then, out of self-respect.  
     In sum. The principle of duty tells me not to act on inclinations without a 
principle endorsing them as sufficient reasons for acting. That principle becomes 
the principle on which I act (or, as the case may be, refrain from acting) when I 
can find no principle endorsing my inclinations as reasons. I act on a principle 
when I can frame one, and when I can’t, on the principle of duty, out of respect 
for the free and autonomous agent I could potentially be and the actual agent 
who has that potential. 
  
 
An End in Itself 
Respect for myself cannot stop at my own freedom. I can perhaps desire freedom 
just for myself; I can like my own potential for freedom. But respect is an attitude 
toward a person as embodying some ideal; it is therefore an attitude ultimately 
toward the ideal, which other persons can embody as well. I cannot truly respect 
myself as potentially free unless I respect that potential wherever it appears, in 
others as well as myself; otherwise, I am merely desiring or liking, not 
respecting. 
     Thus, my motive for acting on principles, including the principle of duty, is an 
attitude toward freedom as an ideal, which can be embodied by anyone. Acting 
without respect for freedom wherever the potential for it appears is therefore 
incompatible with the motive out of which I act on principles, including, when 
all else fails, the principle of duty. 
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     On the basis of such reasoning, or something like it, Kant concludes that I 
have a duty to respect freedom, or the potential for freedom, wherever it 
appears.24 (Kant almost always speaks of respect for autonomy.) Kant even 
claims that the duty to respect autonomy is just another form of the duty not to 
follow inclinations without a principle for doing so. Here I think that Kant 
cannot be right about the implications of his own theory. For if my 
reconstruction of the theory is correct, then respecting autonomy is not really a 
duty; it is rather the motive from which I act on principles, including the 
principle of duty.25 Not to respect autonomy wherever it appears is thus to lack 
the only motive for doing our duty — a lack that constitutes a vice rather than a 
violation. According to the present interpretation, then, Kant’s theory specifies 
both a rule, of not acting without a principle, and a virtue, of respecting 
autonomy, which requires not acting without a principle. 
 
There are various cases in which the requirements of morality are better 
explained in terms of the virtue than in terms of the rule. These are cases in 
which there is no obvious point of convergence on the relevant principle of 
volition.  
     Consider paternalism, in which one agent is inclined to pre-empt another’s 
choices for the latter’s good. One agent may be inclined, for example, to deprive 
another of tempting but potentially harmful opportunities, or to withhold 
information about them. (“Don’t tell her that he called: he’s no good for her.” 
“Don’t offer to sell it to him: he can’t afford it.”) Is there an obvious point at 
which agents would converge on adopting or rejecting the principle of 
                                                
24 428–429, 37–38. See also 431, 39: “[T]he ground of all practical lawgiving lies (in accordance with the 
first principle) objectively in the rule and the form of universality which makes it fit to be a law . . . ; 
subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself 
(in accordance with the second principle) . . .. And 437–438, 45: “The principle, so act with reference to 
every rational being (yourself and others) that in your maxim it holds at the same time as an end in itself, is 
thus at bottom the same as the basic principle, act on a maxim that at the same time contains in itself its 
own universal validity for every rational being.” 
25 436, 43–44: “All maxims have, namely, (1) a form, which consists in universality; and in this respect the 
formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus: that maxims must be chosen as if they were to hold as 
universal laws of nature; (2) a matter, namely an end, and in this respect the formula says that a rational 
being, as an end by its nature and hence as an end in itself, must in every maxim serve as the limiting 
condition of all merely relative and arbitrary ends.”  
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paternalism? Maybe not: some people would prefer to be deprived of dangerous 
opportunities, others would prefer to decide for themselves. So the principle of 
paternalism appears to be one for which there would be no convergence on the 
question of its validity.  
    Here the virtue of respecting autonomy can fill the gap. Respecting the 
person’s autonomy entails allowing him to choose for herself, without 
paternalistic interference. Since creatures who act on principles do so out of 
respect for autonomy, there is after all a point of convergence among them on the 
principle of paternalism; for there is common knowledge that creatures who act 
on principles do so out of respect for autonomy, and will therefore converge on 
rejecting this one. 
 
Conclusion 
One last step and we’ll be done. 
     You may recall that in deriving the content of our duties from the very 
concept of duty, we discovered what our duties would be if we had any. If there is 
anything to which the concept of duty applies, then we know what it must say. 
But is there such a thing? 
     For Kant, this question take a particular form, drawn from the contrast drawn 
earlier between causation and justification. As we saw, my giving 4 as the sum of 
2 and 2 can be viewed, from an external perspective, as issuing from a causal 
process or, from my internal perspective, as based on a justification involving 
abstract relations among numbers and functions. Kant labels these perspectives 
as phenomenal and noumenal, respectively. He says, with good reason, that we 
cannot understand how these perspectives can be reconciled, and yet cannot give 
up either one. For Kant, then, the question whether we are free or governed by 
cause-and-effect is an insoluble mystery. And if we were governed by cause-and-
effect, we couldn’t really act on justifications, we couldn’t act on principles, and 
so we could have no duty to do so, much less a reason for respecting ourselves as 
capable of doing so. Another way of putting this point is that if we were 
governed by cause-and-effect, we wouldn’t be capable of performing acts of 
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moral worth — the capability that Kant adduced in Part I as the prerequisite of 
our having duties.  
     Kant now faces a deep and troubling problem. If we aren’t free, then we have 
no duties, and we can never know whether we are free, because we can never 
dispense with the phenomenal perspective, which is incompatible with the 
perspective of freedom. Hence we can never know whether we have duties.  
     Not to worry. Kant thinks that it doesn’t matter whether we really have 
duties. In Kant’s view, our every act is a bid for freedom, an attempt to be free — 
perhaps a futile attempt, but an attempt that we cannot help making. So we 
cannot help acting as if we could be free, hence as if we have duties. And the 
necessity of acting as if we have duties is just as good as having them.    
      
This completes my reconstruction of Kant’s moral theory as it is laid out in the 
Groundwork. In summary, it goes like this.  
     If I have any duties, they require me to do things even I want to avoid them — 
indeed, even if avoiding them is all I desire. So duties would forbid me from 
doing what it is my every desire to do. But I can’t be forbidden from doing 
something if I can’t help doing it. If I have any duties, then, I must be able to 
refrain from doing what I want to do — indeed, to refrain from it precisely 
because it’s forbidden. Question: How could I refrain from an action when I have 
no desire to refrain, because my every desire is to indulge? Answer: I could 
refrain if I had a principle to determine my will contrary to my desires. Question: 
What principle could I have for acting contrary to my desires? Answer: The 
principle would have to be that I mustn’t act without a principle endorsing my 
desires as good enough reasons for acting. Question: How could wanting to do 
something — indeed, wanting to do it more than anything — fail to be a good 
enough reason for doing it? Answer: Something’s being a good enough reason 
for an action must be common knowledge among reasoners who consider 
whether it is. In some cases, something’s being a good enough reason for an 
action would undermine that very reason, or would make the action impossible. 
(Call these cases contradictions in conception.) In other cases, common 
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knowledge as to whether something is a good enough reason for an action 
would have to result from spontaneous convergence among reasoners, and its 
being a good enough reason is a salient point of avoidance, not convergence. 
(Call these cases contradictions in the will.) Those two kinds of cases are the ones 
in which wanting to do something isn’t good enough reason to do it; and so 
those must be the cases in which I have duties, if I have any. Question: But do I 
have any? Answer: You can’t avoid assuming that you do, because you respect 
yourself as possibly free of your inclinations. And by the way: consistency 
requires you to respect others, too.          1 
     It is an absolutely audacious theory, aiming as it does to derive the content of 
our duties from the mere concept of a duty. In my view, the theory accounts for 
many of our deepest moral convictions. Whether it is true, or perhaps even the 
whole truth about morality, is a controversial question. 
 
